April 21, 2004
Imperialism. Back in a Big Way?
Recently we had a little discussion where the topic of imperialism came up. Indeed, 'empire' and 'imperialism' aren’t just the territory of Marxists and postmodern academics anymore. Imperialism is back in a big way. Sometimes it’s called "liberal", sometimes "neo-". Sometimes plain "imperialism". Anyway, it has experienced something of a resurgence among neocons, with Max Boot's cover article for The Weekly Standard in 2001 a key early document. Josh Marshall provides some background.
For me, the wittiest proponent of imperialism is Niall Ferguson, whose article for TNR back at the beginning of the Iraq occupation is something of a classic...
His conclusion? "Saying one thing and doing another is precisely how imperial democracies behave." Well, I guess that's one way to look at the admin's lies. Indeed, "only hypocrisy will solve America's current dilemma."
Perhaps the best article I’ve read on the topic also appeared in TNR. Back at the beginning of the occupation, before pretty much everything he wrote before the war had been verified time and again, John Judis issued a thoughtful rebuttal on the resurgence of praise for Theodore Roosevelt's imperial ambitions for America. Judis does a good job of tracing the real difference between contemporary neo-imperialism and traditional liberal internationalism.
In addition, John Nichols provides more contemporary reading on the topic.
And finally, perhaps we should take heed of that good old imperialist Kipling, who had words of warning for TR
Take up the White Man's Burden --
And reap his old reward:
The blame of those ye better,
The hate of those ye guard.
For myself, I don't think imperialism is bad in itself. And for the record, I believe France, England, China and Russia, like the US, are all neo-imperialist powers as well. Indeed, Eastern Europe is so concerned about the resurgence of the Russian Empire (the term some politically aware Eastern Europeans use when referring to the Soviets), that they are prepared to send a tithe of their youth to Iraq in order to curry favor with the US. Indeed, US hegemony has reached a historically unprecedented level, and this fact will, quite naturally, continue to transform relations with the rest of the world.
Certainly, imperialism *can* be an instrument for progress and *can* foster the conditions under which real self-determination can take place. But like all *sane* people, I am very skeptical whenever I hear the argument that one nation's coercive force will lead to another nation's betterment. In addition, I feel that a crude imperialism based on coercively advancing national hegemony both on a military and economic level (as advocated by many “neo-imperialists”) is intrinsically linked to a type of paranoid nationalism that not only makes future wars much more likely, but also undermines the international solidarity that I feel is necessary to deal with the great issues of the day (environmental challenges, globalization, controlling population and combating poverty, etc.)
It’s time for an honest public discussion on the question before us—are we going to be “neo-imperialists”, “liberal internationalists”, or “isolationists”? Are we, as a country, self-aware enough to finally accept our role in the world, or is continuing to mislead the populace on the true nature of American hegemony a necessary evil?
Well Scott, it seems that this is the conversation that the neo-cons have been wanting to have for some time. As one who supported the Iraqi war at the onset and now find myself questioning that support I think this is this statement of yours is what has to be debated:
But like all *sane* people, I am very skeptical whenever I hear the argument that one nation's coercive force will lead to another nation's betterment.
My question to you is what does history show us? I often hear Conservative apologist point to Japan and even Germany as places where people said democracy was impossible b/c it did not match well with the character of the people; I don’t know my history well enough by I suspect that such an example is misleading. My guess is that you don't think the Iraqis and their ilk are incapable of democracy rather you think they are unlikely to warm to the idea as long as it is being forced on them by Americans with guns. Do you believe a UN coalition would have a better chance? If so do you think the UN should make it a priority to regularly promote democratic reform in other places?
I guess this is my question to you: If "coercive force" doesn't "lead to another nation's betterment" than what will? Or should we not worry about such tasks at all?
BTW, great post ludwig
I haven't read all the background articles yet so I don't have any good comments, but it's worth pointing out that we occupied Germany and Japan with 200,000 troops each. We were in Japan for almost 10 years, too.
On a more abstract level, it's also been pointed out that though Japan has had a functional democracy since the war, the true principals are democracy are only in the last ten years truly beginning to be felt there. Of course, parallel arguments could be made about the US itself, so that's probably neither here nor there.
Dammit, I meant "principles" of democracy. Thank god I got in here before I could be mocked.
Well, I don't really know the answer to all those questions. But I think Judis' article is a start.
First of all, the analogy linking Germany to Iraq is problematic for a number of reasons. Germany was of course Westernized, industrialized, fully literate. Furthermore, the people of Germany were not only completely exhausted by the war, they were aware that Germany was responsible for starting the war. Nazi-ism was discredited and criminal in a matter of weeks. Futhermore, the alternatives to full commitment to Western democracy were either 1) making Germany a rural state (the original Allied plan) or 2) acceding to Soviet hegemony and vengenance (the Soviets literally raped East Germany). It goes without saying that no powerful person in Germany wanted either of the above. Furthermore, Germany had Republican parties from the Weimar era that were reborn, as well as a largely pro-Western cultural elite returning from American exile, as well as other pre-Nazi leaders like Adenhauer prepared to step up.
In Iraq, I see none of these conditions. Overly optimistic historical assessments, like this one here
http://www.hnn.us/articles/1103.html
suggested that "the Bush administration should build upon the secular, literate and westernized Iraqi populace as a base for a new liberal order in the Mideast." However, the base of this ruling, secular, burocratic class upon which liberal government could be built were the Baathists. Hence the simultaneous plans of de-Baathification and swift transfer to democracy were confused from the beginning. And there was certainly an overestimation of how united and secular the Iraqis are. Of course, realists had been skeptical all along.
But all that is chump change compared to the real difference--there is still an active pan-Arabic media that has interpreted the occupation as a humiliation, not merely for Iraqis, but for all Arab peoples. If the people see us as criminals, why should they be receptive to our ideas? Indeed, the argument can easily be made that American imperialism has discredited liberal ideas, because rather than being based on free choice, they are being asserted with guns. In my view, Arabs respect intelligence and peaceful conduct as much as any other people--if we want to be a positive influence we should exemplify such qualities.
Furthermore, as the Left has pointed out again and again, the US has no history of supporting liberalism in the Middle East, which makes Arabs extrodinarily skeptical of our intentions. We supported the most reactionary regimes because they guarentee the lowest possible oil prices, period. The Baathist nationalist movement, originally a Soviet-backed attempt to nationalize oil resources and (rhetorically speaking) improve the lives of ordinary people, was opposed by us, until pliant regime leaders like Sadat and Saddam came along who were prepared to negotiate in exchange for aid. So why should ordinary Iraqis trust America? Why should they view the nation that sells weapons all over the globe as the proponent of a peaceful and democratic future? And what about the WMD lies, the president's blithe claim that they don't matter?
Of course, I'm not claiming that most Arabs are progressive--it seems they are not. However, as a supposedly progressive nation, we've hardly proven to be a role model.
I think a UN coalition would have had (it may be too late for the UN now) a better chance, if it had garnered a broad coalition including Arab nations, who could pressure the Arab media and better negotiate with the various interests in Iraq. Iraqis know that Arab countries aren't going anywhere.
As for what sort of strategy I would advocate, that's hard to say. I think the coming inclusion of Turkey into the EU is a real historical event--my idea of global progress. To get in, the Turks must commit to certain reforms (both legal and financial). Nevertheless, the Turks and the EU still have vastly different values on a number of issues. But common identity and opportunities for trade emerging out of this arrangement could ultimately lead to the introduction of liberal values into Turkey. Ultimately, Turkey will be swallowed by the EU, rather than the other way around, and the worst thing that could happen is the EU will become more tolerant of Islam, which for me is a normative improvement.
This is the sort of patient, communicative process I would advocate, based on supranational organizations and rules of international law that are binding on all parties and are gradually internalized as norms by all citizens. Breaking such norms would lead to the kind of outrage that is an extremely effective defense mechanism. Obviously, the West and especially the US can and should use their power to propogate their values (for example, using their enormous wealth). The UN and other organizations can move to isolate Saddam-style regimes, and the US can encourage local regimes to liberalize, thus providing an example for oppressed peoples (who, ultimately, cannot hinder the spread of media). But I would advocate returning to a system of voluntary liberalization (although we can of course apply economic pressure, though I would stop short of enforcing sanctions). So I would say we shouldn't worry about toppling non-democratic regimes unless there is a just rationale based on international consensus (intervening in a civil war, stopping aggression, ending genocide), whereupon the liberal community should use its leverage to make the new state as liberal as possible.
Of course, regimes that actually threaten the US and support terrorists are another matter altogether. But again, I would argue that military action should be based upon international consensus, unless this consensus is blocked by a group of nations demonstrably hostile to our interests (which of course was not the case with Germany, Mexico, etc., and actually wasn't the case with France and Russia either). But coercion should never be motivated by economic or purely ideological reasons, because then you have the threat of imperialism in support of big buisness, justifiably hated by all.
More from HNN on the Japan analogy
http://hnn.us/articles/1060.html
Sheesh Scott, your comments are longer than your original post. :)
I don't really have much to add except one point that I noticed when reading the Josh Marshall article. As he correctly points out, the success of neo-imperialism is contigent upon diplomatic power, not just military. The warmongers in power seem to either have forgotten this or never known it in the first place. They see only the constraints imposed upon American power by diplomacy and consensus-building while ignoring the much larger benefits those confer which ultimately leaves us weaker.
Btw, that History News Network looks like an excellent site. Thanks for the link.