the Greater Nomadic Council

Boethius and the Problem of Evil

Although I found much of Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy compelling, there were a couple of points which I think are unconvincing. So far, I've come up with three reasons why this might be:

1. I'm reading a translation and it's possible there are some inaccuracies or poorly conveyed subtleties in it.

2. My shallow philosophical knowledge is preventing me from resolving the apparent problems.

3. There really is a logical problem in Boethius' argument that, although perhaps not apparent then, has become obvious for even a casual reader 1,500 years later.

Of these, the first seems the least likely as it is both a relatively modern translation and one that comes recommended by my professor, a noted medievalist who can read Latin. Furthermore, for the interests of discussion, blaming the translation is the least interesting choice. So, this leaves either a misunderstanding on my part or a problem with the argument itself. I'm split between thinking the former likely, but not necessarily indicative that the latter isn't also true. Also for the purposes of this post, I'm going to assume the latter, but, in case anyone wants to argue this, they should keep in mind that I think my own misunderstanding could likely be a problem. So, preliminaries out of the way, onto the problem with the problem of evil as Boethius explains it in a dialogue between himself and Lady Philosophy:

"No one can doubt that God is almighty," Philosophy began. "Certainly not, unless he is mad," I answered. "But nothing is impossible for one who is almighty." "Nothing." "Then can God do evil?" "No, of course not." "Then evil is nothing, since God, who can do all things cannot do evil."

And later:

"But," Philosophy went on, "the sovereign Good cannot do evil." "Certainly not." "And does anyone think that man can do all things?" "No one in his right mind could think so." "But men can do evil." "Unfortunately, they can." "Therefore, since He who can only do good can do all things, and those who can do evil cannot do all things, it is obvious that those who can do evil are less powerful. Moreover, we have already shown that every kind of power is included among the things which men desire, and that all objects of human desire are related to the good as the goal of their natures. But the ability to commit crime is not related to the good, and so is not desirable. And, since every power should be desired, it follows that the power to do evil is not a power at all. From all this it is clear that good men have power, but evil men are weak."

To me, this second, later passage seems to contradict the earlier one. However, in later sections Boethius attempts to demonstrate how the evil done by men is only apparent evil. Since it is all directed by Providence (i.e. God's will) it appears evil only to us who have limited knowledge. In other words, evil really doesn't exist, even though men can supposedly do it, because in the long view all evil has a good purpose. For some reason, I don't find this convincing. I suppose that if one assumes the existence of God, then the idea that all evil serves a good end becomes a logical necessity. In such a case, it would seem that the argument does hold together. In fact, in writing this I believe I figured out the problem. I had taken the statement that "evil is nothing" too literally in my first reading. Since it came prior to the explanation and elaboration in the next book, it seemed like a contradiction whereas, provided one agrees with Boethius' assumptions, it hangs together.

Maybe this post, then, is a waste of time. So, in order to try and salvage something, I'll move on to a discussion of the second passage. Here we see the interesting and attractive idea that the evil, even if seemingly powerful, rich, and happy, are actually miserable and weak. Again we find an assumption upon which the whole argument rests that we might disagree with, but this one does not rely on the existence of God. Instead, it relies on the nature of humans. To briefly summarize the argument that precedes it which I did not quote, everyone wants happiness which is a good. The ultimate happiness is being good oneself. However, some people seek happiness in transitory, incomplete things such as power or money through error. Since these things cannot provide lasting, complete happiness, those that seek them instead of the ultimate good do not seek what they truly want. Hence, they are impotent and weak. This line of argument is part of the consolation for Boethius, a good man and philosopher who was exiled, imprisoned (during which he wrote this book), and eventually executed.