the Greater Nomadic Council

Mike, I think the basis of many of these claims is that without some conception of absolute natural "right" grounded in belief, one can never really be certain of one's moral convictions.

Besides the obvious problems with ever localizing what natural right might be, I wonder why anyone feels that certainty about one's moral convictions is a mark of virtue. I would think the opposite would be true--the virtuous man is the contemplative man, prepared to and humble enough to adapt to changing circumstances.

What is ironic about the charges of "moral relativism" coming from the Right is that many of the politcal philosophies they value (Hobbesiansim, Machavellianism) are those that seem to put moral relativism front and center. Whereas liberal traditions (Kantianism, Utilitarianism) posit definite ideas about the good. Apparently Strauss believed all of these modern ideas are bad and infused with historicism--yet I'm not clear how the practical ideas differ from Hobbesianism, although his theoretical ideas are certainly different.

Moral relativism is usually a cheap shot IMO--a tactic of discrediting theoretical social science using strawman arguments. However, I think the concept has validity as a critique of research programs that lose track of values--the practical, emancipatory aim of the program--and fetishize relatively meaningless objects. Other times you have modes of analysis that undermine the foundations of normative claims--hence challenging human agency and the ideology of individual autonomy. This necessitates a "realist" critique of moral relativism. Realism in this case would be arguing for value guidelines that have worked in the past against those who would call them into question. Surely, one side or the other isn't absolutely right (how can there be such absolute right in a changing world?) but both sides are vital.

If moral relativism is a problem (and I think it is far less of a problem than conservatives claim), then I would argue that the cause is not so much that scientific minds are too open (that is, lacking religious beliefs). Rather, they are too closed--lacking the multidisciplinarity, well-roundedness, and relation to politics characteristic of the Greeks and Enlightenment rationality. The integrative and synthetic spirit that integrates moral concerns into knowledge enterprises.

ludwig:
The right does not value Machiavelli and Hobbes in any substantial way, in fact they abhor them. Sure a few fringers and libertarians do, but the right fortunately is not composed primarily of fringers and libertarians. The right no more rallies behind M and H than leftists rally around Hollywood and Parisian local politics. They are both more in your tent than the right's, but in no way identify your thought or underpinnings.

Most of the right is very much clear on Mach and Hobbes as statists in direct opposition to the ideals of American society and repellent in many ways to its history and hopefully its future.

I think you have grossly misunderstood the right in a 2dimensional cartoon way, if you think those two authors are in anyway touchstones of conservative Rightist thought.

And to Mallarme,

Conservatives disagree on a fundamental level with you. I do not speak for Matthew Ig. per se, but in general I could see where the fault-lines of the disagreement maybe.

Your opening list of the post reveals my point:
"Morality does not require a belief in a god" and of course aetheists can be moral--or rather not "can be" but must be. (Now if you mean "be moral" to mean "be good" that is another debate...not that I disagree completely, mind you.)

This is the perfect blending of aetheism and moral relativism, two things that are inseperable even in this refutation of yours.

Moral relativists don't understand the word moral. To say morality does not need belief is to admit you don't understand morality, or rather, you don't understand man. We are moral beings, we are always chosing right and wrong, we are never free from moral choice in the same way we are never free from heart-beating. So of course morality does not require belief in God.

What is more aetheistic moral relativism holds that principle which is embedded in that third point I quoted, namely that one's belief in God is the fulcrum on which the rightness and wrongness of a thing turns. Culpability does change in relation to understanding and belief, rightness and wrongness does not change. It is still bad if you don't know it is wrong, it is just less offensive, and more easily forgiven, requiring less punishment etc.

I'm not sure I disagree with you, but I'm also not certain what you mean. I was responding to the hypothetical people posited by Yglesias, namely those that think "atheism" = "moral relativism." I can't tell if you fall under that category or not though since you write "moral atheistic relativism." Are they fundamentally tied together in your mind or are you describing a particular, smaller category of people who are both atheists and moral relativists? And what does the latter term mean to you? I get the impression that it means a morality that changes depending upon one's belief or lack thereof not only in the Christian God, but in any other of the many religious systems. In other words, one that is not universally applicable in all cases—what seems to me to be the equivalent of what the second article I linked calls "cultural relativism."

To say morality does not need belief is to admit you don't understand morality, or rather, you don't understand man. We are moral beings, we are always chosing right and wrong, we are never free from moral choice in the same way we are never free from heart-beating. So of course morality does not require belief in God.

I must disagree with you here. I think I have a good understanding of humanity and morality. Again, I wrote that as directed towards the hypothesized person who does believe that. Or are you suggesting that morality does require such beliefs whether we recognize it or not?

As a human myself (imagine that), I understand perfectly the way our daily choices force us to consider the rightness or wrongness of those choices. I doubt there are many people alive who don't understand or, at least, feel this to be true. The difference for us would be the ultimate source and reason for that morality. I suspect that may be at the heart of this apparent disagreement, but again, I'm not sure there even is one. So, please clarify if you would (or ask me to do so if I'm not making sense).

Matthew,

I have to assume what you say is correct, since I'm obviously not as familiar with the right. Yet I still don't understand. Isn't it commonplace for conservative political philosophy to refer to Mach and Hobbes as having written some of the foundational texts? Don't they usually praise their genius and integrate their insights? Don't conservatives (or at least neo-cons) frequently justify aggression, repression and breaking international law in reference to the "Hobbesian world" we supposedly live in? Isn't it a characteristically conservative move to blast liberal utopianism and cosmopolitanism in favor of the more realistic and grounded view of the world found in Mach and Hobbes?

Perhaps I am making a mistake by conflating conservativism with the statism and imperialism fashionable today. Yet surely we can agree that imperialism is currently an ideology of the right?

Furthermore, I'm not suggesting that we shouldn't look at and learn from Hobbes and Machavelli--I'm just suprised you would deny their influence on political thinking and especially conservative thinking.

ludwig,

I think you are entirely correct that many conservatives refer to Hobbes in approving tones b/c of its influence on Locke and Locke's influence on the Declaration. After actually reading Hobbes though, I am not one of those conservatives. I'm not sure where you are getting Machiavelli from. I think you are correct that many neo-cons have a secret admiration for him but all in all I think most conservatives look at him as the beginning of the problem.

The problem, I think, is that there are many flavors of conservative and each flavor has its own canon. I suppose downto would say the neo-cons aren't real conservatives.

I don't know if this will qualify as hijacking the thread or not, but I thought I'd throw in an extremely interesting thought on Machiavelli that I've come across lately - specifically, that he gets a bad rap. The Prince et al should not be read as a manual for state domination, but as a manual for those resisting state domination. On a mundane level, the characterization of the Prince in the books is relentlessly cynical, and the particular political circumstances at the time of writing were particularly disagreeable to Machiavelli, so there's a historical basis for the idea too. Most importantly though, the book was an early attempt at demystifying the operation of state power, a process which will serve to impair the operation of almost any power system on its subjects.

As for the main discussion, I'm frankly too tired to wade through it all in detail . . .

Oh you deconstructivist, you. Stop reading against the grain.

Or maybe you're a historicist, all talking about what was actually happening at the time. Don't you know how mundane and Bad that is?

I'm still trying to figure out all these silly critical categories, so expect me to slot you all into one sooner or later. Scott, you're a Marxist (as we all know).

Well, in the social sciences, we're all Marxists.

I don't know if the reading of Mach. above falls into any particular mold, though.

There is actually a strain of leftist Italian thought (Agamben) that tries to rehabilitate Hobbes (and really Mach as well) along with some of the Germans he influenced like Carl Schmitt. Traditionally, the Italians are friendly to statism as well as types of continental philosophy that have been marginalized. It's begining to become influential. I haven't read it yet so I don't know what to think. But I suspect a new inter-left discussion on moral relativism is about to begin.

I agree with David on Mach's value as a demystifyer, but along with demystification comes cynicism, immorality, and unrealistic power fantasies in this particular case. At this juncture in history, I would prefer to side with moral principle and moral reciprocity. Yet going back to Mach and other demystifiers like Nietzsche is surely valuable in a more dogmatic age.

Pireaus and Downto,

I agree with you of course that there are many blends of conservatives and conservative canons, so painting with a broad brush is unfair. But my point is firstly it is the continental conservatives and their US disciples who have preserved these discourses, because (IMO) they have proved useful in the past and will prove useful in the future. Secondly, neocon justifications for imposing force and imposing power are awash with morally relativistic arguments--whether they are arguing that America is charged with ordering a Hobbesian world, or that America's superior moral or military rank requires a different kind of morality and moral justification, or whether lies are acceptable in times of trouble. These kinds of arguments are far from unacceptable, even if they are more complex than the neocons admit. But it is ridiculous to accuse the Left of moral relativity in this vein, as it is the Left that has been arguing for moral principle all along, whether for good or bad.

You will get no defense of neo-con defenses from me. Say on, gentle Ludwig, say on...

I would simply say that there is nothing conservative in the neo-conservative other than the fact that the two reside in the same party to a greater extent than they do not.